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tion'to that exclusive list especially in
light of its earlier unwillingness to include the more explicitly protected constitutional right of free speech. Id.
In Bray, the United States Supreme Court clarified its current position on abortion and in so doing, rejected Pro-Choice's latest attempt to
permanently enjoin Pro-Life demonstrators from blocking the entrances to abortion clinics. The Court found there was
no latent conspiracy against women as
a class behind the demonstrations, and
further refused to recognize that a
woman's constitutionally protected
right of interstate travel was infringed
upon by such demonstrations. While
this decision is an apparent victory for
Operation Rescu~, the full impact of
this decision may never materialize given
the two recent shootings that injured
one abortion doctor and killed another,
coupled with the retirement of Justice
White, who joined the majority in this
opinion.

- John M Oliveri
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Georgia v. McCollum: CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS MAY NOT USE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
TO DISCRIMINATE ON THE
BASIS OF RACE.

Court stressed the importance of public
trust in the judicial system to maintain
peace in the community, especially in
race-related cases. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. at 2354. Whether the discrimination was exercised by the State or the
In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. defense, the Court concluded that the
Ct. 2348 (1992), the United States Su- resulting antagonistic feelings towards
preme Court held that defendants in the justice system were the same. Id.
criminal cases may not use peremptory
The Court next addressed whether
challenges to discriminate against po- the use of peremptory challenges by
tentialjurors on the. basis ?frace. In so criminal defendants constituted state
ruling, the Court expanded its prohibi- action under the Equal Protection
tion of racially discriminatory uses of Clause, because state action is required
peremptory strikes beyond the State under the Fourteenth Amendment in
and private litigants to encompass crimi- order to give rise to a Constitutional
na defendants.
violation. Id. The Court first looked to
On August 10, 1990, two caucasian its analysis in Edmonson v. Leesville
defendants were charged with the ag- Concrete Co., III S. Ct. 2082 (1991),
gravated assault and simple battery of which inquired into whether strikes arose
two African-Americans. Prior to jury from a right or privilege of state authorselection, the prosecutor moved to pro- ity. McCollum, 112 S. C1. at 2354.
hibit the respondents from using pe- Observing that both the right to exerremptory challenges to discriminate cise the strikes and their scope were
against potential African-Americanju- defined by state law, the Court deterrors. Both the trial court and the Su- mined that the use of peremptory chalpreme Court of Georgia concluded that lenges was a state right or privilege. Id.
criminal defendants, unlike civil liti- at 2355.
gants and criminal prosecutors, were
The Court next considered whether
pennitted to exercise peremptory strikes the defendants could be viewed as state
to racially discriminate, and thus keep actors, so that their actions would be
African-Americans from serving on the considered state actions under the Equal
jury. The United States Supreme Court Protection Clause. Id. The Court utigranted certiorari to consider whether lized the three prong analysis estabthe prohibition against using peremp- lished in Edmonson which examined
tory strikes in a racially discriminatory the following: (1) the extent to which
manner applied to criminal defendants, the actor relied on governmental assisas well as to the State and civil litigants. tance and benefits, (2) whether the actor
The Court began its analysis by was performing a traditional governconsidering whether such use of pe- mental function, and (3) whether the
remptory challenges by criminal defen- inju ry caused was aggravated in a unique
dants inflicts the same harm on the juror way by the incidents of governmental
and the conmmnity discussed in the authority. Id. (citing Edmonson, IllS.
Batson prohibition on discriminatory Ct. at 2083).
peremptory challenges by the prosecuConcluding that the defendants were
tion. Id. at 2353 (citing Batson v. state actors, the Court applied the three
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986». In prong test and noted that the criminal
concluding that similar harm would arise defendants had substantially relied on
from the use of racially discriminatory governmental assistance and benefits.
peremptory strikes by criminal defen- McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355. In
dants, the Court noted that public dis- addition, the pervasive nature of the
crimination undermines public confi- government's involrement in jury sedence in the courts and the system as a lection through state statutes enabled
whole. Id. at 2354. Furthermore, the the peremptory challenge system to ex-

tions to be a violation of the Equal
ist. Jd.
The Court also found that use of Protection Clause, the Court then conperemptory challenges was a traditional sidered whether the State had third party
governmental function. The Court re- standing to challenge discriminatory uses
lied on its holding in Edmonson which of peremptory strikes. Jd. at 2357. In
stated that "[peremptory challenges '] order to raise a claim on behalfofa third
sole purpose is to pennit litigants to party, a litigant must have demonstrated
assist the government in the selection of that he has suffered a concrete injury,
an impartial trier of fact." ld. (quoting that he has a close relation to the third
Edmonson, IllS. Ct. at 2083). The party, and that there exists some hinCourt found the Edmonson reasoning drance to the third party's ability to
especially persuasive because the se- protect its own interests. ld. (citing
lection of a jury for a criminal case Powersv. OhiO, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-71
represents a unique govenm1ental func- (1991)).
tion and is required by the Constitution.
The Court concluded that the State
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355.
has standing to assert a cause of action
With regard to the third prong of the on behalf of the excluded juror.
analysis, the Court found the injury to McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357. In
be aggravated by the incidents of gov- support of its finding, the Court noted
ernmental authority, further supporting that a State suffers a cognizable injury
the conclusion that a criminal defendant when the fairness of the judicial system
is a state actor. ld. at 2356. The Court is questioned. Jd. The Court emphaemphasized the intensification of the sized the difficulties facing excluded
harmful effects caused by the use of jurors seeking to defend themselves and
peremptory strikes in a criminal setting, the status of the State as the representabecause the removal of a juror is per- tive of its citizens as allowing addiceived to be an action of the State tional reasons for the State to assert the
regardless of who actually exercised rights of the excluded juror. ld.
the strike. Jd.
Finally, the Court examined the
The Court rejected the respondents' broader issue concerning whether the
argument that a criminal defendant can- interests of the criminal defendant
not be acting with govenm1ental characterwhen exercising peremptory challenges because of the adversarial relationship between the defendant and the
prosecution. Jd. The Court explained
that peremptory challenges occur in the
context of choosing the "quintessential
govenm1ental body ... on which our
judicial system depends." Jd. The
Court added that "when a govenm1ent
confers on a private body the power to
choose the government's employees or
officials, the private body will be bound
by the constitutional mandate of race
neutrality." Jd. (quoting Edmonson,
III S.Ct. at 2085). In concluding that
the defendants were state actors, the
Court found that the use of racially
discriminatory peremptory strikes by
criminal defendants was a state action
which violated the Equal Protection
Clause. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at2356.
Having found the defendants' ac-

should prevail over the interests of excluded jurors and the integrity of the
judicial system. Jd. at 2358. In denying
the defendants' rights first priority, the
Court emphasized that peremptory
challenges are not constitutionally protected rights, but are created by the
State to achieve an impartial jury. ld.
FurthernlOre, the Court rejected the idea
that a fair trial included a party's right
to racially discriminate against potential jurors. ld. The Court detennined
that the Sixth Amendment rights of a
criminal defendant were not violated by
prohibiting racially discriminatory uses
of peremptory challenges. ld.
The McCollum decision extends the
prohibition against the use of racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges
from prosecutors and private defendants to criminal defendants. Although
McCollum may promote fairness in the
jury selection process, the consequences
of McCollum could include AfricanAmericar!., criminal defendants losing
the right to strike white jurors on the
basis of race. As a result, AfricanAmericans and other minorities may
lose their ability to be judged by a jury
which includes their peers.

- Susan Oliveri
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